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Summary findings
Many development strategies assume (or desperately  earlier debate. Such a country would be well on its way
hope) that a country already has the capacity to plan and  to development.
implement institutional reform or that such reform can  When the central government lacks such a capability,
be pushed through with the external pressures of aid and  the Hirschmanian approach is to look for "hidden
conditionalities. In a decentralized reform strategy,  rationalities" in small areas or on the periphery and then
developmental change is induced not by government fiat  help the small beginnings to spread-using,  where
but by releasing and channeling local energies in smaller  possible, the natural pressures of linkages. Rather than
projects that will in due course spread through links,  try to put all the pieces of a jigsaw puzzle together at
learning, imitation, and benchmarking.  once to make it look like the picture on the box, one
A "Christmas tree" of conditionalities hung on an  starts in the small areas where the pieces are starting to
adjustment loan is generally ineffective in getting a  fit together and builds outward, using the links between
country to develop "ownership" of reform or in  the pieces.
generating sustainable change. Development agencies  Ellerman shows several authors arriving at a similar
need to work toward client governments' genuine  strategy from different starting points. Similar ideas
commitment to policy reform rather than believe that  underlie the Japanese system of just-in-time production
they can "buy" such commitment with aid money.  based on inventory, local problem solving,
But how does a country get from here to there? Here  benchmarking, and continuous improvement; Charles
is where the Hirschmanian notion of unbalanced growth  Lindblom's theory of incrementalism and muddling
can be "rediscovered." A country that has already  through;  Donald Sch6n and Everett Rogers's treatment
developed a "good policy environment" is like a country  of decentralized social learning; and Charles Sabel's
that can implement the "balanced growth plans" of the  theory of learning by monitoring.
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While "central planning" is now held in ill-repute, similar social engineering techniques are still
promoted in a number of different guises. Indeed, the basic default model of central
government-imposed reforms and change, often backed by conditionalities imposed by aid
agencies, suffers from many of the same problems as central planning.  Ironically as countries
moved away from centralized planning to the decentralized system of economy known as the
"market," they still cling to centralized models of social learning, policy reform, and institutional
change.  Yet the virtues of systems of decentralized initiatives with centralized regulation are
broader than just market activities-which Hayek considered more broadly as a spontaneous
process of forming order through mutual adjustment and the use of local knowledge for problem
solving.'  I will focus on a broader range of decentralized systems (still with some centralized
regulation, coordination, and facilitation) that address some problems of development.
One of the oldest and strongest challenges to the planning approach to development comes from
the seminal work of Albert Hirschman. He responded to the balanced growth, big push, and
development planning models with an alternative framework of "unbalanced growth."  The
limited powers of cognition and implementation of central authorities in the face of the
complexity of organizational, institutional, and social realities do not give much hope for social
engineering approaches-even if the latter did not also contradict the normative goals of
development as the exercise of freedom and autonomy [Sen 1999]. Hirschman as a keen
observer of the development process saw successes as taking place in a rather different way and
he recommended that development projects attend to those "hidden rationalities" more that the
dreams of technocratic rationality entertained by social engineers. Projects need to awaken and
enlist local energies and knowledge for trial-and-error problem solving.  But each problem
solved brings to the foreground other problems and opportunities (forward and backward
linkages).  Change unfolds because "one thing leads to another"-not because a given rational
plan can be implemented step by step.
Consider the analogy with the way an entrepreneur might develop a business.  Success in an
initial effort will create bottlenecks and pressures upstream or downstream that need to be
resolved-as well as opportunities that can be captured.  One thing leads to another in an
evolutionary process of groping, adaptive learning, and experimentation.  Each step is driven by
the local needs to relieve pressures or grab opportunities. It is rather different from following the
imposed performance incentives to move step by step through an engineering plan to construct a
building or build a bridge.  By studying the successful development of a complex multi-faceted
business, would-be entrepreneurs might gain much insight into the process but they should
beware of thinking that the entrepreneurial process can be reduced to a checklist, business plan,
or blueprint.
If entrepreneurial business development is too fraught with uncertainties, complexities,
instabilities, and incomplete knowledge to submit to technocratic planning, then one might well
expect the same to hold for the processes of social reform, change, and development.  For those
1 For example,  see "Competition  as a Discovery  Procedure"  in Hayek 1978. Michael  Polanyi 1951  finds  a similar
process  of mutual  adjustment  in the progress  of science. See  Lavoie  1985  and 1992  on Hayek,  Polanyi, and later
developments.broader processes, Hirschman referred to the "entrepreneurs" as reformmongers and described
that vision of growth and development as "unbalanced growth."
Learning, experimentation, and a one-size-does-not-fit-all pragmatism are basic to any
alternative to the planning, command, and controls models of development. A number of related
theories developed in recent decades will also be surveyed:
*  Herbert Simon's notion of bounded rationality and its multifarious implications,
*  Charles Lindblom's theory of incrementalism and muddling-through,
*  Donald Schon's theory of decentralized social learning,
*  Everett Roger's model of decentralized innovation and diffusion,
*  Japanese management techniques of just-in-time inventories, local problem solving,
benchmarking, and continuous improvement, and
*  Charles Sabel's theory of learning by monitoring.
Finally some half-baked ideas will be broached for designing decentralized programs for the
World Bank or other development agencies.
Conditionality-Based Reforms as Another Failure of Central Planning
Doubts about Conditionalities
Conditionalities on development loans or donor grants are much like the plan specifications in a
model of centrally planned and socially engineered reforms.  In the literature on aid for economic
development, a substantial body of research now questions the effectiveness of conditionalities
in policy-based lending such as structural adjustment loans (SALs). 2 The doubts apply less to
the "pro forma," "stroke-of-the-pen," or price-based conditionalities than to those aimed at
institutional reforms.  As in Killick et al. 1998, our concern is with "hard-core" conditionalities,
i.e., conditions attached to credits or aid that are intended to induce policy-based institutional
reforms in a country.
Institutional reforms lie at the opposite end of the simplicity-complexity spectrum
by  comparison  with  currency  devaluations:  they  are  not  for  the  most  part
amenable  to  treatment  as  preconditions;  donor  agencies  are  liable  to  have
difficulties in keeping track of the extent of compliance; and  such reforms  are
often imperfectly under the control of the central authorities, take time, typically
involve a number of agencies and are liable to encounter opposition from well-
entrenched beneficiaries of the status quo. [Killick et al. 1998, 40]
In the face of these doubts, what is to be done?
Some practitioners plod onward thinking that they only need to make conditionalities "tougher"
and more "performance-based." Such practices do little to address some of the basic reasons for
the ineffectiveness. Tougher performance-based conditionalities do not solve the basic
motivational problem.  This may seem strange from the narrow economic viewpoint, e.g., agency
2  See the discussion and references in Mosley et al. 1991, World Bank 1998, and Killick et al. 1998.
2theory.  Doesn't the carrot of aid provide the motivation?  In psychological terms, the problem is
that the aid only provides extrinsic motivation.  Real reforms beyond the stroke-of-the-pen
variety will usually require some own-reasons or more intrinsic motivations for successful
implementation.  Otherwise there is only the motivation to make the minimal outward changes to
get the aid. In addition, there is a negative reactance against the attempt to externally impose
changes.  Making conditionalities "tougher and more performance-based" does not even attempt
to address these underlying motivational problems. Imposed reforms based on conditionalities
share many of the flaws of central planning under socialism.
Another approach to the doubts about aid-baited conditionalities is to emphasize that aid works
best in countries that have good policies and that aid is largely wasted in countries with poor
policies.  In light of the doubts about conditionalities turning around poor policies, it is suggested
that good policy environments should be selected for more aid. This approach more finesses the
problem than solves it.  The problem is the social learning process to get a country from poor
policies to better policies.
This approach falls back on the one big ex ante conditionality of "good policies" plus policy
dialogue and knowledge-without-aid.  This one-big-carrot approach has the same if not worse
motivational problems as the many-small-carrots approach. Moreover it is doubtful that it would
be sustained under real world conditions of partial fulfillment. If the list of good policies was
partly but not completely fulfilled, then strong political and disbursement pressures would build
(from both sides) to give at least "half a carrot" and we are in effect back to the many-small-
carrots approach.
Aid agencies have their preconceptions of "virtue" in the sense of good policies.  They try fo
"buy virtue" by imposing conditionalities on program aid geared to "virtuous behavior" defined
by various outward acts of allegiance to and implementation of "good policies."  But virtue can
only be found and selected, not bought. 3 If we take "virtue" as being defined not just by behavior
but also by the right internal motives, then aid can only buy a faux-virtue.  Such aid pushes the
external motive of receiving the aid into the motivational foreground and thus establishes
external control-the lack of autonomy.
Autonomy-compatible aid would remove impediments and thus enable "virtuous action" where
the internal motive was already present and remains in the motivational foreground in
accordance with the idea of finding out what people are already motivated to do and helping
them do it better. 4 "In these situations, the donor would set himself the task of rewarding virtue
(or rather, what he considers as such) where virtue appears of its own accord." 5 This leads
straightaway to the "paradox" that aid is only autonomy-compatible when it does not do what is
conventionally taken as a rmajor  purpose of program aid-to  tip the balance of motives in favor
of reforns  and good policies.
3 See World  Bank 1998.
4  " The first  task is to study  what people  are already  doing...and  to help  them do it better....
The second  task is to study  what people  need and  to investigate  the possibility  of helping  them  to cover  more of their
needs out of their own productive  efforts."  [Schumacher  1997,  125]
Hirschman  1971,  204. Italics  added.
3Paradoxically, therefore,  program aid is  fully effective  only when  it  does not
achieve anything-when,  that is, no quid pro quo (in the sense of a policy that
would not have been undertaken in the absence of aid) is exacted as the price of
aid. [Hirschman 1971, 204]
Moreover, once it is known that "virtue" is being rewarded by the donor, then mimicry in the
form of "virtuous behavior" may be elicited in order to also be rewarded-and  that "virtue" does
not appear "of its own accord." This supply effect of such externally motivated mimicry greatly
complicates the provision of aid.
When an externally offered reward or punishment is used successfully to redirect a person's
behavior, then the behavior is said to have an "external locus of causality."  When one acts for
one's own reasons and is the source of one's actions, then one would be said to have an "internal
locus of causality."  Having an internal locus of causality is to act autonomously in contrast to
responding to heteronomously imposed rewards or punishments. 6
External interventions by other people intended to change a person's behavior pose a threat to
autonomy.  The threat-to-autonomy or reactance [see Brehm 1972] effect results from using
external motivators-carrots  and sticks-to  shift the locus of causality from internal to external. 7
The effect shows itself in a poor quality and low effort performance, in sullen and perfunctory
behavior fulfilling the letter but not the spirit of an agreement, and perhaps even in the urge to
defiantly do the opposite just to show one's autonomy. 8 Hirschman refers to these effects as the
"hidden costs" [1971, 207] of program aid while Lepper and Greene [1978] call them the "hidden
costs of rewards."
In the aid context, "good policies" bought by conditioned aid are usually ineffective.  If the
policies were not adopted by the government independently of the aid, then the policies would
tend to be
adopted by aid-hungry governments in spite of continuing doubts of the policy
makers  themselves,  resistance  from  some  quarters  within  the  government,
onslaught against  the  "deal" from  the  opposition, and  general  distaste  for  the
whole procedure.
Naturally, doubts and reservations are not voiced at the moment of the aid
compact; hence the delusion on the part of the donor that there has been a full
meeting of minds.  But soon after virtue has been "bought" through  aid under
6  We use autonomy  or internal  causation  broadly  to include  not only  one's  'original'  integrated  sense  of self but
norms  based  on social  interactions  which  are eventually  integrated  and  internalized  so following  those norms  would
come  to have an internal  locus  of causality. See Deci  and Ryan 1985,  Chapter  5.
7For  example,  suppose  one buys  a townhouse  in the middle  of Winter  and is looking  forward  to Spring  to spruce  up
the poorly  attended  front yard. But  the Townhouse  Association  Beautification  Committee  [a.k.a.  "Lawn  Nazis"]
arrives  before  Spring  to inform  the new owners  that they  must attend  to the yard  or face certain  penalties. Instead  of
just thinking  "Now  we have two reasons  to spruce  up the lawn,"  the new owners  might  well resent  the attempt  to
externalize  their locus  of causality.
8 "Whatever  task is not chosen  of man's own  free will,  whatever  constrains  or even only  guides  him, does not
become  part of his nature. It remains  forever  alien  to him; if he performs  it, he does so not with  true humane  energy
but with  mere mechanical  skill." [von  Humboldt  1963,  47]
4these conditions, the reservations and resistances will find some expression-for
example,  through  half-hearted  implementation  or  sabotage  of  the  agreed-to
policies-and  relations between donor and recipient will promptly deteriorate as a
result. [Hirschman 1971, 205]
Reframing the Question about Conditionalities
The debate about conditionalities is to some extent ill-posed. In 'psychological' terms, the
question is how to best indirectly foster the country's intrinsic motivation for reforms as opposed
to the agency theory question of how to best impose carrots and sticks (extrinsic motivation) to
promote reforms.  Where are the possible reforms that have some rootedness or embeddedness in
the country and are not in response to an offer of assistance?  The best way to assure that a
reform project has some "intrinsic motivation" or rootedness is not to start a project but tofind
it. 9
I began to look for elements and processes...that  did work, perhaps in roundabout
and unappreciated fashion.  [T]his search for possible hidden rationalities was to
give an underlying unity to my work....  [T]he hidden rationalities I was after were
precisely and principally processes  of growth and change already under way in
the  societies  I  studied,  processes  that  were  often  unnoticed  by  the  actors
immediately involved, as well as by foreign experts and advisors.  [Hirschman
1984, 91-3]
With this reframing, the conditionality debate joins an  older debate between balanced and
'unbalanced' notions of growth.
Hirschman's Theory of Unbalanced Growth: "One Thing Leads to Another"
From the earliest postwar discussions of growth, it seemed clear that developing countries were
caught in many vicious circles of poverty and that coordinated actions along a broad front-a big
push-might be necessary to exploit the many mutually supporting complementarities and to thus
escape the low-level trap.  '" Formal growth models emphasized the efficiency properties of
balanced growth paths and development planning models also reinforced the mental image of
coordinated action across sectors."  All of these fell into the general category of balanced growth
models.
All the balanced growth models suffered from the same problem of in effect assuming that which
needed to be developed.  A country with the wherewithal to carry out a coordinated 'big push' of
across-the-board developmental actions would already be well on its way to development
(particularly in terms of capability), not languishing in a low-level poverty trap.  These models
also made the more subtle but equally if not more dubious assumption that all the relevant agents
in a country would simultaneously undergo the required social learning and transformations of
habits that would be required for the big push to succeed (as if a school of fish would altogether
9 Note the contrast  with  the project  manager  who wants  to show  his boss  that he "made  a difference"  by "starting"  a
project.
'1 See Rosenstein-Rodan  1943.
See Solow 1956;  Rosenstein-Rodan  1964.
5decide to jump out of the water and become a new species of amphibians).  It is as if one could
put the pieces of a jigsaw puzzle together all at once after being told to do it like the picture on
the box (e.g., fulfill the 'Christmas tree' of conditionalities on a structural adjustment loan).  That
is not how social learning and change tends to take place.
One of the few voices dissenting from the then near-litany of balanced growth, big push, and
national planning models was that of Albert 0. Hirschman' 2 who noted that "if a country were
ready to apply the doctrine of balanced growth, then it would not be underdeveloped in the first
place." [1961 (1958), 53-4]  In terms of the conditionalities debate, if a country could fulfill the
typical "Christmas tree" of conditionalities attached to multilateral lending (or the one big good-
policies screen), then it would not be in a low-level developmental trap in the first place.
In contrast to the balanced growth approach, Hirschman develops a theory of unbalanced growth
which might usefully be viewed as a theory of social learning and social change." 3 In the 1961
preface to the paperback edition of The Strategy of Economic Development, Hirschman restates
the essential point of the theory.
True, automotive  vehicles  are not  much  good without  highways  and  modern
highways are rather useless without vehicles.  But this does not mean that the only
or even the best way in which we can develop our transportation system is by
expanding  simultaneously  and  evenly  both  the  automotive  industry  and  the
highway network.  Why not  take  advantage of the  stimulus that  is set  up by
expansion of the one toward that of the other?  In other words, I do not deny by
any  means  the  interrelatedness  of  various  economic  activities  of  which  the
balanced growth theory has made so much.  On the contrary, I propose that we
take advantage of it, that we probe into the structure that is holding together these
interrelated activities.  As in the atom, there is much energy here that can be and
is in fact being utilized in building up economic development nuclei.  Later on
these nuclei look as though they could never have been separated even for a single
instant when  in  actual fact they might  never have been assembled  had  not  a
sequential solution, i.e., an unbalanced growth sequence been found, by accident,
instinct,  or  reasoned design.  To  look  at unbalanced growth  means,  in  other
words, to  look at the dynamics of the development process in  the small.  But
perhaps it is high time that we did just that. [Hirschman 1961, viii-ix]
The emphasis on the "dynamics of the development process in the small" has not been well
received by university economists devising formal macroeconomic models of growth.14
12  The locus classicus  is his 1958  The  Strategy  of Economic  Development  but see also Streeten  1959  as well  as a
few of Hirschman's  typically  self-subverting  caveats  in chapter  3 of A Propensity  to Self-Subversion  [1995].
13 See for instance  Schon 1994.
14  "In effect,  Hirschman  said that  both  the theorist  and  the practical  policymaker  could and should  ignore  the
pressures  to produce  buttoned-down,  mathematically  consistent  analyses  and adopt instead  a sort  of muscular
pragmatism  in grappling  with  the problem  of development.  Along  with some  others,  notably  Gunnar  Myrdal,
Hirschman  did not wait for intellectual  exile: he proudly  gathered  up his followers  and led them into  the wilderness
himself. Unfortunately,  they perished  there." [Krugman  1994,  40]
6Learning and change is driven by problem-solving. Not all problems can be attacked at once so
attention and aid is first focused in the small on the sectors or localities where some of the
preconditions are in place and where initiative is afoot on its own. The initial small successes
will then create pressures through the forward and backward linkages to foster learning and
change that is nearby in sectorial or locational terms-all of which might lead to a "growth pole"'5
or local industrial district.  Sometimes these projects might be initially in protected or "ring-
fenced" areas more isolated from the forces reinforcing the low level traps (e.g., corruption and a
predatory government).  The successes when broadcast horizontally to those facing similar
problems will start to break down the paralyzing beliefs that "nothing can be done" and will thus
fuel broader initiatives that take the early wins as their benchmark.' 6 Unlike a model that
assumes large-scale organized social action directed by the government, the parties are
responding to local pressures and inducements from their economic partners or to opportunities
revealed by others in a similar position.
One thing leads to, induces, elicits, or entrains another thing through chains of "tensions,
disproportions, and disequilibria."  Hirschman at one point refers to the principle of unbalanced
growth as "the idea of maximizing induced decisionrnaking" [1994a, 278].  The problem-solving
pressures induced by unbalanced growth will call forth otherwise unused resources and enlist
otherwise untapped energies.  As a project moves from one bottleneck and crisis to another (in
comparison with the smooth planned allocation of resources in a project), then "resources and
abilities that are hidden, scatter, or badly utilized" [1961, 5] will be mobilized.  Hirschman
[1984, 95] notes the connections with Cyert and March's notion of "organizational slack" [1963]
based on Herbert Simon's theory of "satisficing" [1955], with Nathan Rosenberg's theory [1969]
that technological innovation is strongly influenced by "inducing" or "focusing" events such as
strikes and wars, and, above all, with Harvey Leibenstein's theory of X-inefficiency [1966,
1976]. Edmund Burke had captured part of the basic idea:
[Difficulty] has been the glory of the great masters in all the arts to confront, and
to overcome; and when they had overcome the first difficulty, to turn it into an
instrument for new conquests over new difficulties;....  He that wrestles with us
strengthens our nerves, and sharpens our skill. Our antagonist is our helper.  This
amicable conflict with difficulty obliges us to an intimate acquaintance with our
object, and compels us to consider it in all its relations.  It will not suffer us to be
superficial. [1937, 299-300]
In addition, there seems to be another angle to be considered in more depth below.  Compare a
natural activity that people carry out for their own reasons ("unbalanced growth") with a planned,
check-listed, and choreographed version of the same activity (a balanced growth plan).  The
problem basic to organizational theory is to arrange work so that it is more like the former than
the latter. This involves the contrast between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, a theme
'5  See Perroux  1953.
16  In some cases  knowledge  of others'  successful  models  is necessary  even  for possible  learners  to formulate  their
own problems.  "Managers  don't  know  what they want until  they see what they can get; in  this sense,  solutions  are
used to formulate  problems."  [Cole 1989,  36] This  mutual  influence  of means and  ends is characteristic  of the
attitude  of pragmatism.
7developed elsewhere [Ellerman 2000a,b] concerning Douglas McGregor's "Theory Y."  This will
provide another set of arguments for what might be broadly taken as Hirschmanian strategies.
One can draw analogies to the process of individual learning.  Suppose one takes a static snap-
shot of a person's beliefs before and after learning some new and complex interconnected subject
matter.  The older set of beliefs might have certain self-reinforcing properties.  It might at first
seem difficult to change one part of the set of beliefs since one would then have some cognitive
dissonance with the remaining older beliefs.  One could imagine simply changing all the beliefs
at once to arrive at a new self-reinforcing set.  But that is rarely how learning takes place.
Against the forces of self-preservation of the "whole cloth" of older beliefs, there are the
incentives to solve problems for which the old beliefs might be inadequate.  Change might start
in the small where problem-solving progress might be made by unraveling and changing some of
the beliefs.  But now the interconnections can help to unravel the older cloth.  "Bottlenecks" or
inconsistencies will appear between the old and new beliefs, and problem-solving pressures will
be transmitted forwards, backwards, and sideways to adjust other beliefs.  "One thing leads to
another" and eventually the person will arrive at a new set of interconnected beliefs.
Now consider the viewpoint of the knowledgeable outsider, a "teacher" or "trainer," who
understood all along the problem-solving superiority of the new set of beliefs.  Why couldn't he
just give a "core course" to impart the new knowledge to the student and thereby save the pupil
all the time, energy, and pain of "learning the hard way"?' 7 Carrots and sticks, aid and
conditionalities, could even incentivize the "learning process." While a veneer of some
"knowledgeable behaviors" might be incentivized-particularly in "good students"-by such
carrots and sticks, learning that transforms older beliefs does not take place in that manner.  In
order for learners to have an "ownership" of new knowledge and for the new knowledge to have
a transformative effect, the knowledge must be more the fruits of the learner's own activities.
Such knowledge comes out of a constructivist active learning process, not out of a pedagogy of
the teaching imparting, transmitting, disseminating, or pouring new knowledge into passive
students.  With a cons4.uctivist pedagogy, the teacher is more a coach, guide, and midwife
helping the learners in a more indirect manner to help themselves.
Hirschman uses the metaphor of a jigsaw puzzle for the set of problems facing a developing
country [1961, 81-21. One could imagine a rather superhuman act of putting all the pieces
together at once to solve the puzzle.  Indeed don't those who have seen and studied seemingly
similar puzzles put together elsewhere have that knowledge?  That is the comforting fantasy of
those who promote comprehensive, integrated, and balanced reform programs.  Do all these
things together (so that it looks like the "picture on the puzzle box") and you will have solved
your problems!  But for the variety of reasons outlined above, countries cannot just solve all their
problems at once. They must start with a few pieces that fit together and try to work outward to
find other pieces that fit. Not all starting points are equal.  Certain pieces of the puzzle may have
nearby connections and linkages that allow building that part of the puzzle quickly-as opposed to
parts whose solution might give little insight or impetus to solving the nearby parts.  Perhaps
someone who has seen similar puzzles solved would be a good coach to suggest promising
starting points or fruitful directions for progress. No doubt it would be helpful to study the
17  Hirschman  notes  that "such  practices  [will]  tend to cut short  that 'long  confrontation  between  man and a situation'
(Camus) so fruitful for the achievement of genuine progress in problem-solving." [1973, 240]
8"picture on the box."  But the actual solving of the puzzle is a piecemeal process starting in one
or more propitious places and working outward through fruitful linkages to finally arrive at the
new overall configuration.
The Hirschmanian unbalanced growth approach to institutional change is an alternative to the
planning approaches that try to "do everything at once" for fear that piecemeal attempts will fail
(as they undoubtedly might).  That is why it is important to choose the "pieces" of the piecemeal
or incremental approach quite carefully.
A comprehensive attack on all the problems faced by an institution cannot hope to
achieve "final" results in a specified time.  Instead, a few aspects can be identified
on which progress is feasible given the general operational level of the institution,
and the program can concentrate on those aspects for a reasonable period, say,
three years.  After that, the progress that has been made will have ripple effects on
other parts of the institution.  At that point a new program can be designed that
takes account of the new realities-including changes in personnel-but that focuses
on another limited number of objectives.  In sum, comprehensiveness in  scope
and  in  time  should  be  abandoned in  institutional  development  efforts,  and  a
partial, cumulative, and highly focused approach pursued. [Israel 1987, 200]
Douglass North notes that "an essential part of development policy is the creation of polities that
will create and enforce efficient property rights" but that "we know very little about how to
create such polities." [North 1994, 366]  Yet as these social learning processes develop largely
on the basis of their own released energies, new demands will be made on the center or
government to reform institutions, to provide infrastructure, and to clear away impediments,' 8
and that in turn will spur further progress on the ground.
There are many well-known public or semipublic goods of this sort, from power,
transportation, and irrigation to education and public health.  Often designated as
"infrastructure,"  as  though  they  were  preconditions  for  the  more  directly
productive activities, these goods have more usually been provided in response to
urgent  demands  emanating  from  such  activities  and  from  their  need  for
consolidation, greater profitability, and further expansion. [Hirschman 1981, 80-
1]0
These induced demands for reforms are quite different from the externally imposed
conditionalities that stipulate certain reforms or from reforms given by the benevolent "grace" of
18  Hirschman  quotes  approvingly  a consulting  engineer  who suggests  a road surface  that  would  better elicit  pressure
for maintenance  on the public  works  authorities.  "We  assumed  that, with  the increasing  truck  and bus industry  in
Columbia,  local  pressure  would  be applied  to the Ministry  of Public  Works  to repair  the deep  holes which  will
develop  in cheap  bituminous  pavements  if maintenance  and  retreatment  is delayed,  and  that such pressure  would  be
greater  than if a gravel  and stone  road is allow  to deteriorate."  [1958,  143] This strategy  might  be compared  in
effectiveness  to a "conditionality"  toward  the same  end.
19  He cites Albert  Fishlow's  study [1965]  of the development  of American  railroads  as being piecemial  and not
ahead  of demand-and,  one might  add,  not a component  of a master  development  plan.
9the rulers. 20 In psychological terrns, the domestic induced demands for reforms supplies the
government with a more "intrinsic" motivation for reform in contrast to the "tough performance-
based" carrots and sticks imposed by external development agencies and donors, and in contrast
to gifts from benevolent benefactors.  In making the reforms, the government is "in the driver's
seat" and is "doing its job" of responding to its constituents, not just caving in to foreign
pressures.  It is not just playing another round in the aid game: "we will pretend to make the
reforms so that you can pretend to be doing your job as an aid agency by giving us money."
Other Theories of Decentralized Social Learning and Change
Herbert Simon's Theory of Bounded Rationality
One generative metaphor for Herbert Simon's work on bounded rationality is the labyrinth or
maze. 2' We are "in the maze," not "over the maze" surveying all the options from an Olympian
perspective.  One does not see all the possibilities at any one time, one does not know the
probabilities of the outcomes given one's choices, and one does not have the computational
capacity to determine an "optimal" outcome even if one had this information. Thus our capacity
for "rational" behavior is bounded in many dimensions.
Orthodox economics has, according to Simon, reacted to these limitations by trading one
impracticality for another. Instead of assuming knowledge of the outcomes of choice, economics
assumes a known probability distribution so that the decision-maker can maximize the expected
value of the objective.  In contrast, a behavioral theory of bounded rationality [Simon 1955]
would have to 'satisfice' rather than maximize.  Simon also refers to this as "procedural
rationality" in contrast to the "substantive rationality" that only has limited applicability outside
of the laboratory experiments and the textbooks.  One needs to operate on the basis of heuristics
and rules of thumb to prune the tree of possibilities and obtain a decision that is good enough.
Complex decisions might also be made more tractable by identifying tangible subgoals or by
subdividing the problem into parts that can be handled by experienced decision-makers
coordinated through an organizational structure [1979].
While Simon does not directly address the problems of economic development, his work (aside
from Austrian economics) has pioneered the critique of the substantively rational decision-maker
that is manifested in planning models and, more generally, in the ambitions of technocratic
reason.  The contrast of being "in the maze" instead of "over the maze" is a useful mental model
to use in comparing realistic development strategies with the dreams of comprehensive
development planning.
Charles Lindblom's Theory of Incrementalism and Muddling-Through
Economists such as Jan Tinbergen [1956] tended to view public policy-making as a
comprehensive technocratically rational process of surveying the feasible alternatives, evaluating
them according to some agreed-upon objective-or welfare function, and choosing the most
20 See Powelson and Stock 1987 for case studies of successful reforms "by leverage" from below in contrast to
reforms "by grace" from above that eventually failed.
2  See Simon 1991, Chapter 11 "Mazes Without Minotaurs."
10preferred alternative.  Charles Lindblom 22 argued that limited cognitive capabilities, complexity,
uncertainty, and conflicting values excluded any such "synoptic" policy-making process.  For
those reasons, actual policy-making is better described as "disjointed incrementalism" and
"muddling through."  Moreover he would argue that in most commonly occurring policy
environments, sequential decisions are better made in this manner.  When exploring a largely
unknown environment, it is better to take small steps in the neighborhood of what is known than
to take bold leaps into the unknown.
The similarities between Lindblom's process of incremental muddling-through in policy-making
and Hirschman's theory of unbalanced growth were so striking that they authored a joint article 23
pointing out the convergence. Both approaches are skeptical of order, balance, and detailed
programming based on foresight, centralized direction, and integrated overviews.
[Both] agree it is most important that arrangements exist through which decision
makers  are  sensitized  and  react  promptly  to  newly  emerging  problems,
imbalances, and difficulties; this essential ability to react and to improvise readily
and  imaginatively  can  be  stultified  by  an  undue  preoccupation  with,  and
consequent pretense  at, advance  elimination of these problems and  difficulties
through 'integrated planning'. [Hirschman and Lindblom 1969, 364]
One of the popular themes today in aid agencies is knowledge-based development assistance
conceived of as the agency "giving" or disseminating the solution to a problem to a developing
country.  Yet Hirschman and Lindblom agree that this will "often result in complicating the
problem through mistaken diagnoses and ideologies" and thus they argue that "the much
maligned 'hard way' of learning by experiencing the problems at close range may often be the
most expeditious and least expensive way to a solution." [364] Where conflict arises, they see
the "mutual adjustment" of the participants as achieving a kind of coordination that could not
have been anticipated or centrally planned.  Similar processes of mutual adjustment without
central control are evidenced in the procedures of common law (coordinated by precedents set by
different judges), in Michael Polanyi's theory of coordination in science, 24 and Mary Parker
Follett's notion of horizontal coordination by reciprocity in organizations. 25 Finally, they see in
this "political adjustment and strife analogues to self-interested yet socially useful adjustment in
the market." [364]
Donald Schon's Theory of Decentralized Social Learning
Centralized research in a company often faces the problem of translating the results to the core
businesses of the organization.  Can research "impose" its best ideas on the often reluctant
operational units?  The operational units might not appreciate the genuine breakthrough
embodied in the research, or the research unit might not realize the inapplicability of its pet
ideas. The research-operations relationship faces all the problems of the center-periphery
relation described by Donald Schon in a context close to the World Bank's work.
22 See Lindblom  1959,  1979,  1990  and  Braybrooke  and Lindblom  1963.
23 Hirschman  and  Lindblom 1969. The article  also  considered  the convergence  with the theory  of technological
research  and development  of Klein and  Meckling  1958.
24  See  Polanyi 1966  p. 217 or 1966  pp. 70-4 in addition  to 1951.
25  See Metcalf  and Urwick 1942  pp. 297-314  cited in Lindblom  1965,  p. 8.
11[The  standard  approach]  treats  government  as  center,  the  rest  of  society  as
periphery.  Central has responsibility for the formation of new policy and for its
imposition on localities at the periphery.  Central attempts to  'train'  agencies at
the periphery.  In spite of the language of experimentation, government-initiated
learning  tends  to  be  confined  to  efforts  to  induce  localities  to  behave  in
conformity with central policy.  Localities learn to beat the system.  Government
tends to bury failure or learn from it only in the sense of veering away from it.
Evaluation, then, tends to be limited to the role of establishing and monitoring the
extent of peripheral conformity with central policy. [Sch6n 1971, 177]
But social learning can take place in a decentralized bottom-up manner with centralized
coordination.  In large multi-plant companies, innovation may take the form of new ways of
socially organizing and structuring productive processes, e.g., quality circles or self-managed
work teams.  Separate plants might perform pilot experiments to find out "what works and what
doesn't."  Headquarters frames the experiments, detects the successes, and plays the knowledge-
broker to help other plants cross-learn from the successful ones.  Schon described a similar
process between the government and the periphery of local units trying to carry out a certain
social reform.
Government cannot play the role of 'experimenter for the nation', seeking first to
identify the correct solution, then to train society at large in its adaptation.  The
opportunity for learning is primarily in discovered systems at the periphery, not in
the nexus of official policies at the center.  Central's role is to detect significant
shifts at the periphery, to pay explicit attention to the emergence of ideas in good
currency, and to derive themes of policy by induction.  The movement of learning
is as much from periphery to periphery, or periphery to center, as from center to
periphery.  Central comes to  function as facilitator of society's learning, rather
than as society's trainer. [Sch6n 1971, 177-8]
These two models of the center as trainer in the center-periphery model or as the
broker/facilitator in the decentralized model are the two very different models for a "Knowledge
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Social  learning  is often  very  different  from  laboratory  learning.  Novel  complexity,  genuine
uncertainty,  conflict  of  values,  unique  circumstances,  and  structural  instabilities  mitigate  against
"laboratory  conditions"  for  discovery  and  learning.  Decentralized  experimentation  with
centrally-sponsored  framing  and  quality  benchmarking  followed  by  cross-learning  in the
periphery 26 is a more  appropriate  model  than  classical  "normal  science"  research  at a central
facility  followed  by  the  teaching-dissemination  of  the  (sometimes  impractical)  results.
Everett  Roger's  Theory  of  Decentralized  Innovation  and  Diffusion
In  Everett  Rogers'  early  work  on the  diffusion  of  innovations  he  focused  on  the  classical  hub-
and-spokes  or  center-periphery  model  of diff-usion.
In  this  classical  diffusion  model,  an  innovation  originates  from  some  expert
source  (often  an  R&D  organization).  This  source  then  diffuses  the  innovation  as  a
uniform  package  to  potential  adopters  who  accept  or  reject  the  innovation.  The
role  of  the  adopter  of  the  innovation  is  that  of  a  passive  accepter.  [Rogers  1983,
333]
Spurred  on  by  Sch6n's  work  [1971],  he  became  aware  of  decentralized  diffusion  systems  with
horizontal  diffusion  between  peers  (which  might  involve  partial  re-invention 2"  of  the  model)
rather  than  vertical  transmission  from  experts  to adopters.
26  See CityNet 1998 for a manual on peer-to-peer knowledge transfers and for websites that organize this process
using the Internet.
27  "The significance of this point of view is that contrary to the simplistic use of the term by many economists, there
is, in principle, no such thing as diffusion of best practice.  At best, there is only the diffusion of best practices,
practices that evolve in the course of their diffusion. Contrary to popular wisdom, there are times when it pays to
reinvent the wheel!" [Cole 1989, 117] "Every alleged example of local implementation of central policy, if it results
in significant social transformation, is in fact a process of local social discovery." [Schdn 1971, 161]
13During the late 1970s I gradually became aware of diffusion systems that did
not  operate  at  all  like the  relatively  centralized diffusion  systems that  I  had
described in my previous books.  Instead of coming out of formal R&D systems,
innovations often bubbled up from the operational levels of a system, with  the
inventing done by certain users.  Then the new ideas spread horizontally via peer
networks, with  a  high  degree of re-invention occurring as the innovations  are
modified by users to fit their particular conditions....
Gradually, I began to realize that the centralized diffusion model was not the
only wheel in town. [Rogers 1983, 3341
Perhaps the best example of centrally sponsored system of decentralized innovation and
diffusion in a developing country is in China over the last quarter of a century. Contrary to the
classical model of reform models being established in the center and disseminated to the
periphery, the Chinese recognized local reform models which could be in a region, county,
commune, or even brigade.  The local model could be in any sector or area such as
administration, health, education, or industry, and could be visited by groups from all over China
who want to make a similar reform in their locality.
The diffusion of innovations in China is distinctive in that it is (1) more horizontal
in nature, (2) less dependent upon scientific and technical expertise, and (3) more
flexible in allowing re-invention of the innovation as it is implemented by local
units.  These aspects of decentralized diffusion are facilitated by China's use of
such diffusion strategies as models and on-the-spot conferences.  The "learning
from others" approach to decentralized diffusion in China was adopted officially
as a national policy in the national constitution in 1978. [Rogers 1983, 340-1]
The same period marks the beginning of China's historic record of growth and development at
the end of the twentieth century.
Just-in-Time Inventory and Continuous Improvement Systems
The Japanese just-in-time (JIT) inventory system can be looked at as a system of production
learning.  Buffer inventories in production might be analogized to loans from international
development agencies that allow one to get by current difficulties without necessarily solving the
underlying problems.  But with a JIT system, the costs of the problem are evident and attention is
then focused on solving the problem so that it does not recur again. Hirschman has praised the
low tolerance for error and narrow latitude of some technical systems (e.g., aircraft maintenance
or road surfaces where the low maintenance will show up as destructive potholes) which thus
serve as inducement or pacing mechanisms for maintenance and learning.  High tolerance for
error or wide latitude for maintenance would operate like high inventory levels to weaken the
incentives for corrective actions.
Just as a lowering of the water in a canal will reveal obstacles to navigation, so a systematic
reduction in the levels of inventories will bring problems to the surface so that this created
necessity will be the mother of invention to resolve the problems.  Then with a continuous
14reduction in inventory levels, other problems will come to the surface and be resolved in a
process of continuous improvement.
This  successive removal  of  inventories  creates  bottlenecks in  production  that
make it possible to identify each work station's weaknesses; and in this way it is
analogous to the potentially informative disruptions of production caused by, say,
the construction of a new steel plant in stories of unbalanced growth. [Sabel 1994,
240]
Hirschman has been asked if he would actually advocate "unbalanced growth" in view of the
efficiency properties of the formal models of balanced growth (which ignore the dynamics of
learning), and one of his responses is that in the JIT inventory system, "the Japanese initiate and
induce it." [Hirschman 1  994b, 319]
Charles Sabel's Theory of Learning by Monitoring
Although not explicitly developed as a theory of learning, Hirschman's theory of unbalanced
growth can be usefully seen as a theory of decentralized social learning [see Sch6n 1994] in a
manner that will induce decision-making by the "doers of development," will collect and release
scattered and dormant local energies, and will instill "ownership" in the learners.  The Japanese
system of just-in-time inventories, local problem-solving by teams, benchmarking between
teams, and continuous improvement can also be seen as a system of systematic learning in
production that induces decision-making, problem-solving, and ownership by the participants.
Charles Sabel has developed these and other examples in his theory of learning by monitoring
[1994].
Often development strategies are flawed by implicitly assuming that which needs to be created.
This often takes the form of assuming an effective governance system is in place so that a
development advisor simply has to pour some new wine into the sound bottle, e.g., design a
comprehensive set of conditionalities to be implemented by a developing country.  In large
organizations, top managers often adopt new strategic plans as if the problems lay in the
specifics of the plan rather than in the lack of capacity to implement management's writ.  The
implicit assumption of an effective governance system imputes to the government of a country or
to the management of a company a capacity to resolve coordination and collective action
problems by command and control. Hirschman and Sabel take a different starting point.  They
ask how collective action problems are solved in the small and how change does take place-
without assuming an effective fiat from the center.  By developing a more realistic theory of
change, they can then "back out" a more reasonable description of what the center could do to
catalyze, assist, broker, and guide the process-rather than trying to finesse the problem by
assuming ab  initio that the center can effectively implement its plans.
Sabel's treatment of collective action problems through learning by monitoring is particularly
fruitful by showing important ways in which trust and "social capital" are developed without
falling back on the conventional banalities about cultural inheritance and education.  Individuals
are assumed to have some sociability, some powers of reflection and discussion, and incomplete
identities always in the process of formation and change (incompletely specified preference
orderings in economists' terms).  They are often in problematic situations where some
15cooperative action would benefit the group but where each may be vulnerable to the non-
cooperation of others (which could be defection or simply error).  The problem being discussed
is not a problem involving others in some distant place; it is the group members' own common
problem so that they would be involved in implementing any proposed solution (the "learning")
and will thereby be monitoring the actions of others-and hence the description "learning by
monitoring."  The discussion to arrive at a collective action plan must also include discussion of
how to apportion the gains from cooperation and how to adjudicate differences that will arise.
So far the description of learning by monitoring does not differ substantially from the repeated
games treatment of the evolution of "cooperation" [e.g., Axelrod 1984].  Sabel goes beyond the
game-theoretic treatment by assuming that the self-definitions and identities of the participants
are changed by the discussion and cooperative efforts. Part of the discussion is to reinterpret and
reframe their past, to discover and clarify their interests, and to establish a group identity with
which the members can start to identify so that the cooperation is based more and more on "who
they are" than on a tenuous game-theoretic modus vivendi (cooperating today only to avoid
punishment tomorrow).  The reciprocal belief that others also cooperate partly on the basis of
identification (rather than strategy and guile) will lead to giving others some "benefit of the
doubt" by interpreting occasional non-cooperation by members as error rather than betrayal.  In
such a manner, trust and the norms of reciprocity (social capital) can be developed.
Central managers or coordinators, instead of being assumed as a deus ex machina, can be seen as
agents of the group facilitating the "government by discussion" within the group and helping to
minimize the vulnerabilities of cooperative action-while through benchmarking and other means
of competitive stimulus helping to insure that the group continues to face the problems that come
to light.
Where a set of people have interdependent opportunities and fates, the group members through
initial problem-solving discussion and action accompanied by mutual monitoring can start to
bootstrap a new collective identity that can help to stabilize future cooperative problem-solving
and learning.  Overall, this is a species of pragmatism which John Dewey saw as being
exemplified in scientific communities and democratic polities.
Learning by monitoring is in this sense an institutional device for turning, amidst
the  flux  of  economic  life,  the  pragmatic  trick  of  simultaneously  defining  a
collective-action  problem  and  a  collective  actor  with  a  natural  interest  in
addressing  it.  The  disequilibria  created  by  learning  by  monitoring  are
informatively  effective  for  the  same  reasons  as  scientific  experiments  and
democratic  rule;  and  under  these  conditions  the  differences  between  the
disciplines  of  the  factory  and  the  laboratory  dwindle  in  the  face  of  their
similarities. [Sabel 1994, 272]
Could a Project be a Decentralized Competitive Social Learning Process?
How might some of these ideas be brought to bear on project design?  Start with a persistent
social problem in a developing or transitional country, e.g., how to do bankruptcies, industrial
restructuring, promoting small private firms in a corrupt environment, and so forth.  The Center
proposes a contest of subunits (e.g., regions, states, cities, etc.) for the best approach to
16addressing or solving the problem.  To qualify, an entrant must make public the "theory" behind
their approach (e.g., get the best guru from an elite university or agency, and ask him how to
solve the problem, or look at how the problem was addressed in slightly more developed
countries, and so forth).  Moreover, they must agree to be judged by certain public benchmarking
criteria (which they might themselves propose).  Based on the proposals, some of which could
describe already existing programs, the Center will select a certain number of winners and will
provide material assistance in some form, e.g., a block grant. The assistance will always require
a substantial matching contribution (which could be as prior investment) from the entrants to
assure that they want to solve the problem, not just get the assistance.  The losers in the contest
will learn the winning theories as to how the problem can be addressed and they may choose to
adapt their own mode of operation.  After a certain time period, the results are assessed
according to the previously agreed-upon benchmarks to see who the real winners were.
There might be a second round of assistance where aid would go to those who did well in the
first round (whether they previously received assistance or not).  The point is to encourage
horizontal or cross-learning between those who did well and those who didn't.  Project funds
might also be used to sponsor visits or secondments so that the laggards could learn directly from
the emerging success stories.  The public benchmarking establishes a rolling standard that will
ratchet up as social learning improves performance (continuous improvement).  Matters of local
pride and prestige will play a role.
This type of project starts with a problem, not with a solution. Locally adapted and rooted
solutions are found by decentralized experimentation, not imposed from the Center.  The Center
acts as a sponsor of the decentralized social experiment and acts as a broker to facilitate cross-
learning of the laggards from the leaders.
Conclusions
Many development strategies implicitly assume (or desperately hope) that a country already has
a planning and implementation capacity to make institutional reforms from the top down and/or
that institutional reforms can be somehow pushed through with the external pressures of aid and
conditionalities.  In a decentralized reform strategy, developmental transformations are induced
not by governmental fiat but by releasing and channeling local energies in smaller projects that
will in due course spread by forward and backward linkages as well as through horizontal
learning, benchmarking, and imitation.
Although Albert Hirschman developed his strategy of unbalanced growth in response to the post-
war theories of the "big push," development planning, and balanced growth, we can triangulate
on essentially the same overall strategy from different starting points.  The Japanese system of
production based on just-in-time inventory, local problem solving, benchmarking, and
continuous improvement,  Charles Lindblom's theory of incrementalism and muddling through,
Donald Sch6n's and Everett Roger's treatment of decentralized social learning, and Charles
Sabel's theory of learning by monitoring are all based on similar ideas.
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